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00:00 
good morning good a fte rnoon and good 
00:02 
evening to a ll our advertis e rs  from 
00:04 
va rious  pa rts  of the world my name is  
00:06 
a li abedi s e rving a is hwarpa li a s  region 
00:09 
1 a s s is tant a rea  cha ir and a s s ocia te  
00:11 
vice  pres ident for res earch a t the 
00:13 
univers ity of ma ine before  we s ta rt our 
00:15 
webina r today i would like  to thank our 
00:18 
ieee  colleagues  in s ilicon va lley and 
00:20 
bos ton s ections  i truly regen one  uh 
00:24 
us a  ieee  india  and actua lly china  for 
00:27 
promoting this  event which yie lded over 
00:30 
321 regis tra tions  
00:33 
a  s pecia l thanks  to is rae li 
00:34 
communica tions  s ocie ty and computer 
00:36 
s ocie ty's  joint chapter here  in ma ine  a s  
00:39 
well a s  univers ity of maine  a rtific ia l 
00:41 
inte lligence  initia tive  for planning and 
00:44 
hos ting this  event 
00:45 
pleas e make  s ure  to ente r your ques tions  
00:48 
in the  qr may box and we 'll ans wer them 
00:50 
a t the  end of the pres enta tions  
00:53 
it is  now my grea t plea s ure  to introduce 
00:56 
our modera tor 
00:57 
dr julia  upton as s ocia te  profes s or of 
01:00 
ma thema tics  a t aus tin univers ity voice 
01:03 
cha ir of i triple  e  ma in s ection and 
01:05 
cha ir of i triple  e  ma in communica tions  
01:07 
and computer s ocie ty joint chapter to 
01:10 
introduce  our s peakers  julia  
01:13 
thank you a li 
01:15 
uh i would like  to welcome everyone  on 
01:17 
beha lf of ieee ma in s ection and the  join 
01:21 
computer s ocie ty communica tion s ocie ty 
01:23 




will we  have  four s peakers  for you today 
01:30 




uh rea r admira l re tired bill layer 
01:39 
s erved in the  united s ta tes  navy for 33 
01:42 
yea rs  in inte lligence  and cryptologica l 
01:44 
warfa re  
01:45 
his  ca reer s panned the  cold war des ert 
01:48 
s torm  and the  globa l war on te rroris m 
01:51 
his  m inion navy a s s ignments  included the 
01:53 
deputy director for informa tion 
01:55 
technology and communica tions  a  
01:57 
commander nava l s ecurity group command 
02:00 
for meade  maryland 
02:02 
and a t the  na tiona l s ecurity agency 
02:04 
where  he  s erved as  a  s enior opera tions  
02:06 
officer in the na tiona l s ecurity 
02:09 
opera tions  center 
02:10 
he  s erved as  the commanding officer 
02:13 
nava l informa tion opera tions  command in 
02:15 
norfolk virginia  where  he  was  s e lected 
02:18 
to flag rank in 2008 
02:21 
a s  a  flag officer he  focus ed on cyber 
02:24 
warfa re  s e rving as  the  director of 
02:26 
informa tion opera tions  on the  s ta ff of 
02:28 
the  chief of nava l opera tions  
02:31 
and a s  the  deputy commander for u.s  
02:33 
flee t cyber command u.s  10th flee t and 
02:36 
the  director of warfa re  integra tion for 
02:39 
informa tion dominance  on the  navy s ta ff 
02:41 
in the  pentagon 
02:43 
he  re tired from the  navy in 2014 and 
02:46 
worked in the defens e  indus try focus ing 
02:48 




ra re  admira l lehr is  a  na tive  of ma ine 
02:55 
and has  a  bache lor of a rts  degree  in 
02:57 
politica l s cience  from the  univers ity of 
02:59 
s outhern ma ine and a  mas te r of a rts  and 
03:02 
na tiona l s ecurity and s tra tegic  s tudies  
03:04 
from the  u.s  nava l war college 
03:07 
s o le t's  welcome our firs t s peaker for 
03:09 
our a rtific ia l inte lligence  and cyber 
03:11 






thank you very much dr upton uh it's  uh 
03:22 
my honor to  be  uh 
03:24 
to be pa rt of the  pane l today and and 
03:27 
the  firs t thing tha t i will do i a lways  
03:28 
ge t a  little  nervous  when uh 
03:31 
i did in engineering intens e  uh 
03:33 
environments  tha t i want to  emphas ize  my 
03:35 
my s cience  was  politica l s cience  and and 
03:38 
today i think you'll s ee 
03:40 
probably a  lot more  a long the  policy 
03:42 
implica tions  
03:43 






wha t tha t means  and i think it tees  up 
03:51 
s ome of the  other pane lis ts  s o i've  got 
03:53 
a  pre tty s hort pres enta tion and uh 
03:58 
you know it kind of goes  a long with with 
04:00 
s ome thinking tha t i've  been doing of 
04:01 
la te  and you know how a re  we going to 
04:04 




cyber s ecurity over the  next couple  of 
04:08 
decades  and 
04:10 
you know for a ll tha t's  been s a id and 
04:12 
written about the end of uh 
04:15 




you know we were  there  for a  rea s on we 
04:21 
were  there  becaus e  the united s ta tes  was  
04:23 
a ttacked and 
04:24 
and we s pent an awful lot of money in 
04:26 
iraq and a fghanis tan over the  la s t two 
04:29 
decades  and a  lot of us  will remember 
04:32 
exactly where  we were  uh 20 yea rs  ago uh 
04:36 
in remembrance ceremonies  
04:38 
this  uh 
04:39 






you know coming out of of where  the 
04:46 
na tion has  been 
04:48 
you know i i 
04:49 
think i come to the  conclus ion tha t 
04:51 
we 're  very unlike ly to have  another 
04:54 
la rge  
04:55 
uh conflic t tha t will commit wha t we  did 
04:57 




if tha t's  only a  gues s  
05:03 
prognos tica tors  a re  horribly bad a t 
05:05 
predicting predicting war but 
05:08 
wha t does  tha t mean for for cyber and 
05:11 
cyber s ecurity in pa rticula r and 
05:14 
you know we a ll know if you're  looking 
05:16 
in this  this  kind of a rea  tha t the  pace 
05:19 
and the complexity of globa l cyber 
05:21 
a ttacks  in the  la s t 
05:23 
you know 25 yea rs  has  
05:25 
uh changed s ignificantly 
05:28 
now from my bio you you'll ge t pre tty 
05:30 
quickly tha t i was  the pa rt of the  navy 
05:32 
in the  pa rt of the  navy tha t was  
05:34 
a s s ocia ted with na tiona l s ecurity agency 
05:36 
in fort me i s pent you know mos t of the 
05:39 




and you know through tha t i s aw you know 
05:45 
tha t rea lly 
05:47 
you know how we us e cyber uh as  pa rt of 
05:50 
es pionage  and 
05:52 
and you know as  time went on and in 
05:55 
be ing involved in the  s tand up of you 
05:58 
know the  navy cyber s ervice  flee t s occer 
06:00 
command and 10th fleet 
06:02 
you know there 's  rea lly tha t tha t 
06:04 
s pectrum tha t es pionage  where it 
06:06 
probably s ta rted in a ll na tions  
06:09 
there 's  certa inly cyber crime tha t 
06:11 
a ffects  us  a ll and and then you know 
06:13 
wha t i focus  on wha t i think about is  is  
06:16 
wha t cyber means  for warfa re  
06:19 
and you know for warfare  it's  s een the 
06:21 
s ame kind of uh 
06:24 
evolution tha t tha t we 've  s een in 
06:26 
protecting bus ines s es  and protecting 
06:28 
everything from from kitty s cripts  to 
06:30 
fis hing to zero uh day exploits  and and 
06:33 
la s tly with the s ola r winds  
06:36 
uh a ttack uh you know a  very complex 
06:39 
s upply cha in 
06:41 
uh exploit and and the  cos ts  a re  
06:44 




you know wha t was  clea rly a  politica lly 
06:49 
motiva ted uh 
06:51 
you know a ttack in 2007 in es tonia  you 
06:54 
know it's  rea lly ha rd to pinpoint wha t 
06:55 
the  cos ts  were  and you know s ome los s  to 
06:58 
banking revenue  is  es tima ted a round a  
07:01 
million dolla rs  
07:02 
you go forward you know you know e ight 
07:05 
yea rs  uh to wha t happened in in s audi 
07:07 
a rabia  aga in probably a  politica lly 
07:10 
motiva ted a ttack and retribution for 
07:13 
uh for s tuxnet you know 35 000 computers  
07:17 
another 7 500 s ervers  des troyed 
07:20 
and and it put the  s audi a rabia  oil 
07:23 






a  couple  yea rs  la te r with not pe tya  
07:28 
aga in you know computers  des troyed more 
07:30 
s ervers  des troyed billions  los t and one 
07:32 
of the  inte res ting things  about not 
07:34 
pe tya  
07:35 
is  tha t a  
07:37 
united s ta tes  ins urance 
07:40 
ca rrie r decla red tha t it was  an act of 
07:42 
war and and has  re fus ed to to  pay on 
07:45 
ins urance s o 
07:47 
thes e  kind of uh 
07:49 
cha llenges  a re  in the  na tiona l s ecurity 
07:51 
rea lm  for a ll tha t we  do with s ober for 
07:53 




la s tly within within the yea r you know 
07:59 
s ola r winds  which is  
08:00 






wha t i think has  
08:07 
caus ed me 
08:08 
you know thought and worry as  as  it go 
08:10 
is  the 
08:12 
you know a lmos t the  s ens e  of 
08:14 
he lples s nes s  and and where  do you s ta rt 
08:17 
to unrave l this  tha t i hea rd from cyber 
08:19 
s ecurity experts  and people  who a re  
08:22 




and you know the  s tudy tha t was  done  by 
08:28 
you know pres identia l pane l uh 2016 tha t 
08:31 
you know thes e  cos ts  you know amount 
08:33 
be tween you know s even 
08:35 




uh it's  incredible  amount of money 
08:40 
tha t's  los t to  the economy 
08:43 
and s o 
08:44 
if we  do have  this  s itua tion where  we 
08:47 
a re  
08:48 
you know looking for 
08:51 
you know wha t cyber s ecurity looks  like 
08:53 
in a  con 
08:54 
uh outs ide  of a  conflic t you know we 've 
08:57 
got to  think about where  we a re  with 
08:59 
de te rrence  and 
09:00 
you know we know tha t there 's  a  c los e 
09:02 
re la tions hip be tween crimina l hackers  
09:04 
and na tion-s ta te  
09:05 
a ttackers  tha t you know an example of 
09:08 
tha t is  in in many pieces  of 
09:11 
uh ma lware  you can s ee  tha t it checks  
09:13 
for the pres ence  of a  cyrillic  keyboa rd 
09:16 
uh s o it does n't land on a  rus s ian 
09:19 
ta rge t 
09:20 
the  united s ta tes  has  tried you know 
09:22 
crimina l indictments  but they're  
09:24 
incredibly difficult to  act on 
09:27 
uh there  a re  often conflic ting roles  
09:29 
be tween es pionage and cyber s ecurity uh 
09:32 
we s aw tha t in the  obama  adminis tra tion 
09:35 
with you know agreements  with pres ident 
09:37 
z tha t we kind of le ft tha t a ll off the 
09:39 
table  becaus e  we we do want to  collect 
09:42 
inte lligence  
09:43 
but with with a ll de te rrence  there 's  a  
09:47 




wha t we 're  trying to 
09:51 
uh prevent with s ome actions  
09:54 
and i think we 've s een a  diffe rent look 
09:56 
with with pres ident biden and 
09:59 




21 uh warning but the  the  problem with 
10:05 




and if everything is  important how a re 
10:11 
we going to rea lly make tha t enforceable  
10:14 
and you know 
10:15 
followed by tha t did it have  an e ffect 
10:17 
is  the  our evil uh kind of dis appea ring 
10:20 




from the  you know environment for a  
10:26 
while  is  tha t connected yeah i don't i 
10:28 
think it's  too ea rly to  know 
10:30 
but but a ls o in a  more  promis ing thing 
10:33 
you know s hortly a fte r the  putin biden 
10:36 
uh s ummit 
10:37 
there  was  a  m icros oft uh exchange  s erver 
10:40 
a ttack tha t was  uh a ttributed to china  
10:43 
and in both na to and the  eu join the 
10:46 
united s ta tes  and in condemning tha t s o 
10:49 
there 's  got to  be  thes e  kind of of 
10:52 
things  uh happening in this  environment 
10:54 
where  we 're  
10:56 
us ing a ll the  tools  of na tiona l s ecurity 
10:58 
to be able  to  do tha t and and la s tly you 
11:01 
know i think it's  you know we 're  gonna  
11:02 
have  to re think cyber s ecurity over the 
11:05 
long haul and wha t 
11:07 
you know it could mean over the  next 
11:08 
couple  of decades  and 
11:10 
and you know s ecurity has  to  be  more  by 
11:12 
default it you turn it on it's  going to 
11:14 
be  s ecure  tha t's  two-factor 
11:16 
authentica tion digita l identities  
11:19 
for mos t things  tha t we  do online  i know 
11:21 
tha t's  controvers ia l there  a re  s ome 
11:23 
machine  lea rning a i things  with file les s  
11:26 
ma lware  de tection you know a  company 
11:28 
ca lled blue  vector 
11:29 
you know has  advanced threa t de tection 
11:31 
tha t it lea rns  pre tty quickly wha t a  
11:34 
norma l environment looks  like  and is  
11:37 




identify thos e  things  tha t a re  abnorma l 
11:44 
and and like ly ma lware  in an environment 
11:47 
and and work with uh traditiona l 
11:49 
cybers ecurity s ys tems  zero trus t it 's  a  
11:52 
huge  thing 
11:54 
within the  federa l government and dod uh 
11:56 










i have  to make it more  difficult to  
12:05 
remove  informa tion from a  s ys tem and in 
12:09 
tha t a rea  it's  things  you know da ta  los s  
12:12 
prevention it looks  aga in 
12:13 
with machine lea rning tools  to  to  do 
12:16 
behaviora l ana lys is  in rea l time to s ay 
12:19 
this  this  is  s omething tha t you don't 
12:21 
have  permis s ion to do 
12:23 
uh and one  of the  things  we lea rned from 
12:25 
uh s ola r winds  is  you know policy 
12:28 
enforcement which we 've  genera lly ta lked 
12:30 




it applies  to  individua ls  but policy 
12:36 
enforcement a ls o has  to apply 
12:39 
to uh s oftware  authorities  and if you 
12:41 
thought a  little  bit about the  s ola rwind 
12:43 
product tha t was  be ing us ed to 
12:46 
dis tribute  pa tches  uh wha t uh wha t can 
12:49 
your s oftware  acces s  and and and wha t 
12:51 
s hould it not be  able  to  acces s  s o 
12:54 
s o uh bringing uh tha t thinking tha t 
12:56 
we 've  done  uh in a  human s ens e  to a  
12:58 
machine  s ens e a s  well 
13:00 
and and the  las t thought is  it you know 
13:03 
comes  from an a rtic le  tha t was  you know 
13:05 
publis hed in fore ign a ffa irs  about a  
13:07 
yea r ago by genera l nakas one  who's  the 
13:09 




is  defending ford 
13:15 
in a  traditiona l m ilita ry s ens e 
13:16 
defending forward is  s omething tha t 
13:18 
we 've  a lways  thought about you if you 
13:20 
wa it for s omeone  to a ttack you you're  
13:22 
probably going to los e  100 of the  time 
13:25 
i've  long a rgued tha t tha t cyber is  no 
13:28 
diffe rent than defending an a ir bas e  or 
13:30 
or defending aga ins t the  s ubmarine  and 
13:33 
genera l nakas oni bas ica lly s ays  we have 
13:35 




and tha t leads  to you know i think 
13:41 
rea lly how we think about cyber defens e 
13:43 
how we leverage  the 
13:45 
practices  and the  authorities  of our 
13:47 
a llies  to  be able  to  do tha t s o i think 
13:50 
tha t's  about my time and i will turn it 
13:52 
back over to  julian 
13:56 
thank you very much admira l 
14:00 
if you have  any ques tions  for the 
14:01 
admira l plea s e type  them into the  q a  
14:04 




our s econd s peaker 
14:09 
is  s cott mcgann 
14:12 
s cott mcgonn has  been a  s pecia l agent 
14:14 
with the  federa l bureau of 
14:15 
inves tiga tions  for 25 yea rs  
14:18 
during his  time with the fbi he  has  
14:20 
inves tiga ted white -colla r crime the 
14:22 
rus s ian and ita lian mafia s  cyber crime 
14:25 
counter-te rroris m  and es pionage ma tte rs  
14:29 
s pecia l agent magan is  an fbi certified 
14:31 
firea rms  ins tructor a  member of the 
14:34 
fbi's  evidence  res pons e team a  certified 
14:37 
police  ins tructor an fbi agent faculty 
14:41 
member teaching fbi cours ework to police 
14:43 
agencies  domes tica lly and abroad 
14:46 
he  rece ived his  undergradua te  degree 
14:48 




his  mas te r of s cience  in crim ina l 
14:54 
jus tice  from the  univers ity of 
14:55 
mas s achus e tts  a t lowell and his  mba  from 
14:59 
bentley univers ity 
15:00 
he  currently teaches  is s ues  in cyber 
15:03 
crime and cyber s ecurity a s  an adjunct 
15:06 




in addition s pecia l agent ghan was  
15:11 
nomina ted for the 2018 a ttorney 
15:14 
genera l's  award for fraud prevention 
15:17 
and the 2018 fbi director's  award for 
15:20 
outs tanding crimina l inves tiga tion 
15:23 
for his  involvement in an inte rna tiona l 
15:25 
corpora te  es pionage inves tiga tion 
15:28 
agent magang is  the  a lpha  team leader 
15:30 
for opera tion works peed the  government's  
15:33 
full-s ca le  e ffort to s ecure  the 
15:35 
deve lopment and de livery of the  covit 19 
15:38 
vaccine  it currently is  a ls o involved in 
15:41 




in academia  about cyber threa ts  
15:46 
corpora te  es pionage counterinte lligence 
15:48 
ma tte rs  ins ider threa ts  and inte llectua l 
15:51 








thank you s o much dr upton uh i'm going 
16:01 
to ta lk about s omething tha t's  a  little  
16:03 
bit outs ide  the  norma l rea lm  for 
16:05 
engineers  and and i i genuine ly thank my 
16:08 
colleague  for jus t introducing s ome of 
16:10 
the  ideas  of es pionage and hacking and 
16:14 
a ll of thos e  things  tha t i ta lk a  grea t 
16:16 
dea l about but one  of the  things  tha t 
16:18 
i've  been involved with la te ly tha t the 
16:20 




is  a  number of diffe rent a s pects  to  the 
16:27 
whole  s ubject of fore ign influence  and 
16:30 
wha t i'm  re ferring to is  tha t our 
16:33 
country has  a  number of diffe rent 
16:34 
advers a ries  out there  in the  world and 
16:38 
a s  a s  does  every country certa inly 
16:41 
but as  pa rt of this  
16:43 
there  a re  advers a ries  out there  na tion 
16:46 
s ta tes  tha t a re  looking to obta in our 
16:49 
technology when they can't deve lop it 
16:51 
thems elves  s o a s  uh ieee  a  s ocie ty of 
16:54 
engineers  uh who a re  out there  working 
16:57 
ha rd to deve lop thes e  things  we don't 
16:59 
want to  s ee tha t idea  uh tha t 
17:02 
inte llectua l property s tolen by fore ign 
17:05 
agents  and s o i want to  ta lk a  little  
17:08 
bit about tha t becaus e  the 
17:10 
how it us ed to happen in the  pas t is  not 
17:12 
how it happens  now when we 're  dis cus s ing 
17:14 
es pionage  in the  pas t we  us ed to ta lk 
17:17 
about uh s pies  coming into the  country 
17:20 
deve loping s ources  and a s s e ts  and and 
17:23 
they would s tea l but now it's  s o much 
17:25 
broader than tha t and i want to  give  you 
17:27 




we 've  s een the  headlines  uh previous ly 
17:34 
a ll over the  na tion about 
17:37 
diffe rent entities  uh diffe rent 
17:39 
countries  obta ining intellectua l 
17:41 
property whether a t univers ities  or 
17:43 
res ea rch a s s ocia tions  or companies  uh 
17:46 
obta ining this  technology for the ir own 
17:49 
benefits  certa inly s omething tha t the 
17:51 
fbi in the ir counter inte lligence 
17:54 
counter es pionage  divis ions  
17:56 
try to work aga ins t 
17:59 
i i i'm  jus t amazed tha t i can even s how 
18:02 
you this  s lide  tha t it 's  been 
18:04 
uncla s s ified in yea rs  pas t we  certa inly 
18:07 
wouldn't ta lk about anything re la ted to 
18:10 
counterinte lligence  but a s  you can s ee 
18:12 
here  from uh this  s lide  we have  a  number 
18:15 
of counter inte lligence  cas es  throughout 
18:18 
the  government throughout the  fbi 
18:20 
and the ca s es  on technology trans fer 
18:24 
have  increas ed markedly over the  la s t 
18:27 
two decades  
18:29 
i became involved with 
18:31 
inte llectua l property theft and economic 
18:34 
es pionage  in the  middle  of my ca reer and 
18:38 
have  not gotten away from it becaus e 
18:40 
it's  become s o preva lent you can s ee 
18:42 
tha t ca s es  on economic es pionage  and 
18:45 
counter prolife ra tion of technology 
18:48 
has  uh increas ed to about a  third of our 
18:52 
tota l counterinte lligence  cas es  and 
18:54 
aga in from my pers pective  be ing a  an fbi 
18:58 
agent for 26 yea rs  i have  never s een the 
19:02 
fbi put out a  s lide  like  this  previous ly 
19:05 
to the public  um s o this  s hould be  a ll 
19:07 
new informa tion for you but it 
19:09 
highlights  the importance  of technology 
19:12 
trans fer and i us e  tha t te rm  in the 
19:14 
pe jora tive  uh of technology trans fer a t 
19:17 
the  fbi 
19:20 
uh and and wha t i a lluded to previous ly 
19:22 
was  tha t technology trans fer is  coming 
19:26 
in a  lot of nefa rious  uh from a  lot of 
19:28 
nefa rious  vectors  it us ed to be  jus t 
19:31 
s pies  coming here  trying to find 
19:33 
informa tion uh and bring it back to 
19:35 
the ir home country and certa inly we have 
19:37 
tha t we  uh tha t has  never gone  away but 
19:40 
we a ls o have  diffe rent uh entities  
19:43 
diffe rent na tion s ta tes  uh influencing 
19:46 
our government as  we 've  hea rd about in 
19:48 
the  2016 e lection certa inly in the 2020 
19:51 
e lections  this  topic  has  come to the 
19:54 
fore  but a ls o more importantly and i 
19:57 
i'm  in the  bos ton a rea  and work in 
19:59 
grea te r new england and i can te ll you i 
20:02 
have  s een non-traditiona l collectors  a t 
20:04 
the  12 o 'c lock o 'c lock pos ition on this  
20:06 




uh much more  important to  fore ign 
20:13 
governments  and s o thes e  non-traditiona l 
20:16 
collectors  a re  people  who a re  not 
20:17 
tra ined s pies  but they s imply have 
20:19 
acces s  to  the  informa tion tha t other 
20:22 
governments  want and for va rious  rea s ons  
20:24 
and s ometimes  becaus e  of a  little  
20:27 
intim ida tion they provide  this  
20:29 
informa tion uh from our country to the ir 
20:32 
typica lly the ir country of origin or to 
20:35 
other fore ign governments  there  a re  a  
20:38 
number of diffe rent ways  tha t fore ign 
20:39 
governments  will obta in 
20:42 
inte llectua l property informa tion and 
20:44 
the  ideas  tha t engineers  deve lop e ither 
20:47 
through hacking influence  or a  lot of 
20:50 
times  through ta lent convers ion where 
20:53 
they will have  ta lent recruitment 
20:55 
programs  and a  number of comp uh 
20:57 
countries  have  this  where  they will 
21:00 
acquire  informa tion from an individua l 
21:03 
who is  a  leader in tha t pa rticula r fie ld 
21:06 
s o if the  fie ld is  nano technology 
21:09 
they will e ffective ly co-op s omeone 
21:12 
through money cas h or a  number of other 
21:14 
methodologies  uh in order to  provide 
21:17 
tha t country with 
21:19 
informa tion uh on nanotechnology in tha t 
21:22 
pa rticula r example 
21:24 
s o s ome of the  techniques  a re  lega l 
21:26 
certa inly joint ventures  a re  providing 
21:28 
money and inves tment into companies  is  
21:31 
lega l but oftentimes  thos e  techniques  
21:34 
a re  not 
21:35 
clea rly trans pa rent in wha t's  going on 
21:37 
and certa inly une thica l a t a  m inimum 
21:41 
i'll give  you an example  in the  ta lent 
21:43 
plan uh cas e tha t i jus t mentioned 
21:46 
rega rding technology uh s ome of you may 
21:48 
know he  made  headlines  la s t yea r dr 
21:51 
lieber of ha rva rd univers ity uh was  
21:54 
a rres ted by mys e lf and s ome of my 
21:56 
colleagues  uh for making fa ls e  
21:59 
s ta tements  uh was  the  initia l cha rge  but 
22:02 
he  was  a llegedly involved in a  ta lent 
22:04 
program and i'll s how you here  an 
22:06 
excerpt from the  a ffidavit for the 
22:08 
a rres t warrant where  it's  highlighted 
22:11 
here  tha t he  was  ge tting fifty thous and 
22:13 
dolla rs  per month and an extra  150 000 a  
22:17 
yea r for living expens es  and money to 
22:19 
deve lop a  lab 
22:20 






you can s ee here an extra  50 000 
22:27 
a  month on top of a  uh wha t i perce ive 
22:31 
to be a  generous  ha rva rd s tipend uh an 
22:34 
annua l s a la ry uh was  certa inly 
22:37 
motiva ting for dr lieber when i a rres ted 
22:39 
him  with my colleagues  
22:41 
um he  was  certa inly not s urpris ed to s ee 
22:45 
uh tha t this  was  s omething s o if you a re  
22:47 
approached a s  an engineer out there 
22:49 
deve loping s ome new technology 
22:52 
or s omeone  a t your uh company has  been 
22:56 
approached uh there  is  a  quid pro quo 
22:59 
expected when s omeone 's  paying you fifty 
23:02 
thous and dolla rs  a  month uh for the 
23:04 
informa tion tha t's  in your head 
23:08 
here  is  a  traditiona l s py ms  yay here 
23:12 
was  a t bos ton univers ity uh pos ing as  a  
23:16 
s tudent s he  was  a  member of a  top 
23:19 
milita ry academy and directed by a  
23:22 
fore ign government 
23:23 
la s t yea r we  looked to a rres t her but 
23:26 




before  s he  could be  a rres ted 
23:31 
this  young man was  a  medica l s tudent as  
23:34 
well in the  bos ton a rea  and 
23:37 
his  uh activities  were  dis covered a t the 
23:40 
a irport when 21 via ls  of a  biologica l 
23:43 
s ubs tance  were  found wrapped in his  s ock 
23:46 
when he  was  trying to go back to his  
23:48 
country of origin he  was  a rres ted a t 
23:50 
logan a irport wha t's  more  inte res ting 
23:53 




30 times  within a  s ix-month period with 
24:00 
diffe rent individua ls  um s o this  is  uh 
24:04 
the  wholes a le  theft of inte llectua l 
24:07 
property in this  cas e  from our bio bio 
24:10 
uh pha rma  indus try in the  bos ton a rea  
24:14 
and a s  fa r a s  corpora te  es pionage  goes  
24:16 
here 's  a  grea t ca s e i like  this  cas e  i 
24:19 
ca ll it a  grea t ca s e  becaus e  it was  one 
24:21 
of my cas es  uh american s uperconductor 
24:24 
was  a  company here  in mas s achus e tts  and 
24:26 
the ir inte llectua l property the ir low 
24:28 
voltage ride  through s olution for your 
24:31 
e lectrica l engineers  out there  in the 
24:32 
audience  uh was  s tolen by a  fore ign 
24:35 




uh ego a s s uas ion and uh s exua l favors  uh 
24:46 
in order to  uh ge t de ion ca rabas ovac 
24:50 
s een right here  who was  a  s e rbian 
24:52 
na tiona l uh to flip for the ir pa rticula r 
24:55 
company s o he  was  the ins ider a t 
24:58 
american s uperconductor who gave  the 
25:00 
crown jewels  to a  fore ign competitor uh 
25:04 
a  very inte res ting cas e  which i can 
25:06 
us ua lly ta lk about a t length um it was  
25:09 
jus t made  into an fbi documenta ry which 
25:12 
will be  coming out this  month s o very 
25:14 




inte lligence  opera tions  will ta rge t 
25:25 
academics  and res ea rchers  and recruit 
25:28 
uh people  a t va rious  companies  in our 
25:31 




profes s iona l ne tworking s ites  i am  not 
25:38 
immune from this  uh here  mandy which i'm 
25:41 
s ure  is  her given name uh reached out to 
25:44 
me on linkedin a s  i ge t to  the end of my 
25:46 
ca reer i put up a  linkedin page  and it 
25:48 
was n't very long before  mandy wanted to 
25:51 
be  friends  uh for thos e  of you who don't 
25:53 
know the  us  government is n't rea lly 
25:56 
enamored with tick-tock but i'm  s ure 
25:58 
it's  okay becaus e  you note  down here 
26:00 
tha t the  culture  there  is  magica l s o i'm 
26:02 
s ure  it's  okay to accept tha t uh 
26:04 
linkedin connection i jus t uh 
26:06 
s creens hotted this  as  uh for my future 
26:09 
lectures  becaus e  it was  s omething i had 
26:11 
ta lked about in the  pas t and here  it was  
26:14 
uh actua lly happened to me but not only 
26:17 
tha t but more  inte res tingly is  my 
26:20 
uh my two s ons  who a re  young ma les  in 
26:24 
the ir ea rly twenties  were  approached by 
26:27 
a s ian individua ls  a ttractive  fema les  on 
26:30 
the ir s ocia l media  right a fte r i ignored 
26:34 
this  uh 
26:35 
this  connection reques t and certa inly um 
26:38 
there  they don't m ind clicking on 
26:40 
connections  with a ttractive  uh fema les  
26:42 
from other countries  but they came to me 
26:45 
having had the  counter inte lligence  
26:47 
lecture  tha t i give  my children uh be ing 
26:50 
s ons  of an fbi agent and i s a id yeah 
26:53 
tha t's  becaus e  of me thanks  and uh they 
26:55 
ignored thos e connections  s o this  does  
26:58 
happen and it's  s omething you're  
27:01 
probably not very familia r with or 
27:03 
haven't hea rd much of but it does  happen 
27:06 
a ll over our country every day happens  
27:09 
to people  in the ieee  as  well 
27:13 
um and quickly wha t can we do to protect 
27:16 
ours e lves  i te ll everybody ca ll your 
27:18 
loca l fbi and pa rtner with them uh 
27:22 
corpora tions  who a re  out there  can ge t 
27:23 
be tte r lectures  uh than this  brie f 
27:26 
introduction and can get informa tion on 
27:29 
ris ks  and conflic ts  of inte res t we s peak 
27:32 
to boa rds  we  s peak to executives  we  ta lk 
27:35 
to adminis tra tors  a t res ea rch 
27:37 
ins titutions  a ll over the  country s o ge t 
27:40 
with your loca l fbi and as k for the ir 
27:43 
priva te  s ector coordina tor there 's  one 
27:46 
in every fbi office  and they will be 
27:49 
able  to  as s is t you in protecting 
27:52 
yours e lves  and certa inly they can hook 
27:54 
you up with the  cyber uh crime s quad i 
27:57 
worked in computer hacking for a  dozen 
27:59 
yea rs  i was  on the  cyber crime s quad and 
28:02 
even though i le ft it to  work other 
28:03 
ma tte rs  i never got away from cyber 
28:05 
crime s o i s till go out there  and 
28:07 
lecture  on bus ines s  ema il compromis e  and 
28:10 
rans omware  and hacking and 
28:12 
uh da rk web and a ll of thes e  other 
28:15 
s ubjects  but i wanted to introduce you 
28:17 
to the s ubject of uh fore ign influence 
28:20 
and es pionage um s omething you probably 
28:23 
don't ge t a  lot of a t your regula r uh 
28:25 
meetings  and uh i thank you 
28:31 
thank you very much s cott um 
28:34 
if you have  any ques tions  pleas e pos t 
28:37 
them in q a  
28:39 
and it's  my pleas ure  to introduce  our 
28:41 
next s peaker 
28:44 
dr dan s hoemaker 
28:46 
dr dan s chumacher rece ived a  doctora te  
28:49 
from the  univers ity of michigan in 1978 
28:52 
he  taught a t m ichigan s ta te  univers ity 
28:54 
and then moved to the  directors hip of 
28:56 
the  informa tion s ys tems  function for the 
28:58 
medica l s chools  a t ms u 
29:00 
he  he ld a  joint teaching a t depa rtment 
29:02 




when mercy was  cons olida ted with the 
29:07 
univers ity of de troit in 1990 he  moved 
29:09 
to the bus ines s  s chool to  cha ir the ir 
29:11 
depa rtment of computer informa tion 
29:13 
s ys tems  
29:14 
he  a ttended the  organiza tiona l rollout 
29:16 
of the  dis cipline  of s oftware  
29:18 
engineering a t the  ca rnegie  mellon 
29:20 
univers ity s oftware  engineering 
29:21 
ins titute  
29:23 
in the  fa ll of 1987 and he  was  a lready 
29:26 
teaching an s e i bas ed s oftware 
29:29 
engineering curriculum which he 
29:30 
es tablis hed as  a  s epa ra te  degree  program 
29:32 
to the mba  within the 
29:35 
udm college  of bus ines s  adminis tra tion 
29:38 
dr s howmaker s pecific  a reas  of 
29:40 
s chola rs hip publica tion and teaching 
29:42 
were  the  proces s -bas ed s tages  of the  
29:44 
wa terfa ll s pecifica tions  s qa  and 
29:47 
acceptance  s us ta inment he  was  a ls o a  
29:50 
primary cons ultant in the  de troit a rea  
29:52 
on the  cmm cmmi 
29:55 
dr s chumacher's  trans ition into cyber 
29:57 
s ecurity came as  a  res ult of the  audit 
30:00 
and compliance  e lements  of tha t body of 
30:02 
knowledge  a s  well a s  the  long 
30:04 
es tablis hed 
30:05 
s qa  s cm e lements  of the ir curriculum 
30:09 
they were  des igna ted the  39th center of 
30:11 
academic exce llence  by the  ns a  a t wes t 
30:14 
point in 2004 and they have  tried to 
30:17 
s tay on the  leading edge  in the 
30:18 
a rchitectura l a s pects  of cyber s ecurity 
30:20 
s ys tems  des ign and implementa tion as  
30:22 
well a s  s oftware  as s urance 
30:25 
a s  a  res ult of dr s chumacher's  
30:27 
a s s ocia tions  with ns a  and his  inte res t 
30:30 
in s oftware  a s s urance  he  pa rtic ipa ted in 
30:33 
the  ea rlies t meetings  of the  s oftware 
30:34 
a s s urance  initia tive 
30:36 
he  was  one  of the  three authors  of the 
30:38 
common body of knowledge  to produce 
30:40 
acquire  and s us ta in s oftware  and he 
30:42 
cha ired the  workforce  educa tion and 
30:44 
tra ining committee  from 2007 to 2010. 
30:48 
he  was  cha ir of workforce  tra ining and 
30:50 
educa tion for the  s oftware  a s s urance 
30:52 
initia tive  a t dhs  
30:54 
and he was  s ubject ma tte r expert for uh 
30:57 
you know for nice 
30:59 
s ecurity provis ion 
31:01 






human s ecurity 2017. 
31:09 
he  a ls o publis hed frequently in the 
31:11 
build s ecurity and webs ite  
31:13 
this  expos ure  led to a  grant to  deve lop 
31:16 
curricula  for s oftware  as s urance  and the 
31:18 
founding of the  center for cyber 
31:19 
s ecurity where  he  currently res ides  the 
31:22 
center is  a  free-s tanding academic unit 
31:24 
in the  college  of libera l a rts  which is  
31:26 
the  adminis tra tive  locus  for res ea rch 
31:29 
centers  within udm 
31:31 
dr s hoemaker's  fina l s ignificant grant 
31:34 
was  from the  depa rtment of defens e  to 
31:36 
deve lop a  curriculum and teaching and 
31:38 
cours e  ma teria ls  for s ecure  acquis ition 
31:41 
in conjunction with the  ins titute  for 
31:42 
defens e  ana lys is  and the  na tiona l 
31:44 
defens e  univers ity 
31:46 
a  book was  s ubs equently publis hed by crc 
31:49 
pres s  
31:52 
welcome dr s hoemaker 
31:58 




i can hea r me i can't s ee  me 
32:07 
we can s ee  you we can hea r you we can 
32:09 
s ee  you and hea r you okay well then i'm 
32:12 








you know i when i do thes e  things  i try 
32:20 
to think about s omething tha t the  group 
32:22 
would find inte res ting 
32:24 
s o uh wha t i came up with 
32:26 
uh was  pre tty well covered by the firs t 
32:28 
two people  and s o i gues s  i'll jus t s ay 
32:31 




i le t me 
32:36 
ge t my 
32:38 




when i do thes e 
32:54 
ieee  vis its  i 
32:56 
try to come up with s omething tha t is  
32:59 
s ort of fits  with the 
33:01 




mos t of the time i end up ta lking about 
33:06 
s upply cha in ris k management which is  my 
33:09 
a lleged a rea  of expertis e  
33:11 
um and um i 
33:14 
thanks  to the  s ola rwinds  people  i i find 
33:16 
mys e lf ta lking to a  lot of a  lot of 
33:18 
folks  about tha t but 
33:20 
um s ince  this  was  a i 
33:22 
i kind of 
33:24 
uh you know s ort of 
33:27 
tried to come up with s omething tha t 
33:28 
would be  a t leas t fit within tha t kind 
33:30 
of context and uh wha t i came up with 
33:33 
was  uh 
33:34 
s ome work i did back in 
33:36 
2008 uh was  it was  publis hed bas ica lly 
33:39 








um and then wha t do i end up doing is  
33:46 
following an fbi agent s o you know you 
33:49 
can take  for wha t i've  got to  s ay uh you 
33:51 
know for wha tever it's  worth 
33:54 
but it 's  a  modes t propos a l and it fits  
33:56 




wha t you've  s een s o fa r in the  firs t two 
34:03 
pres enters  uh is  true 
34:07 
we 've  got a  worldwide  problem with cyber 
34:10 




micros oft did a  s urvey tha t was  rea lly 
34:16 
eye-opening publis hed back in december 
34:19 
uh about the  the  kind of the  the  cos t of 
34:23 
of cyber a ttacks  
34:25 








billion dolla rs  with a  b in 2015 
34:35 




by 2020 it es ca la ted to 2 trillion 
34:43 






by the  time 2024 rolls  a round the 
34:52 
es tima te  is  6 trillion 
34:54 
s o uh it looks  like  uh cyber crime is  a  
34:58 
growth indus try it's  s omething tha t you 
35:00 








one  of the  things  you might want to  us e 
35:08 
a s  a  s ens e  of context is  
35:11 
tha t 6 trillion is  the  gros s  na tiona l 
35:13 












now the  reas on why obvious ly and people  
35:26 
the  firs t two pres enters  ta lked about 
35:28 
this  a t grea t length uh is  the na ture  of 
35:31 




it's  anonymous  and it's  borderles s  and 
35:35 
s o how in the world do you 
35:39 
defend aga ins t or pros ecute 
35:42 
s ome guy who is  s itting s omewhere  you 
35:44 
know not where  um a ttacking you 
35:48 






and um it's  pos s ible  in certa in 
35:54 
countries  tha t if they're  s ucces s ful in 
35:56 
doing tha t to you um they may end up 
35:59 
with a  uh you know a  meda l uh 
36:02 
to a s  a  reward um and you know bas ica lly 
36:05 
wha t you've  got to  s ay is  a  bunch of uh 
36:09 
cultures  um tha t um a re  not neces s a rily 
36:14 
um going to be 
36:17 
big fans  of the united s ta tes  uh and 
36:20 
here  we a re  s itting there  kind of like  a  
36:22 
big fa t uh 
36:23 




the  inte rne t its e lf makes  it a lmos t 
36:29 
impos s ible  to  to  um 
36:34 






s ome a re  willing to lead footprints  but 
36:42 




the  inte rne t crim ina l is  wha t's  known as  
36:47 
an unknown s ubject um and the  only way 
36:51 
to rea lly kind of addres s  an unknown 
36:53 
s ubject is  by 
36:54 
the  cla s s ica l 
36:56 
approach known as  profiling 
37:00 
which bas ica lly us es  big behaviora l 
37:02 
s igna ture  s igna tures  
37:04 
now profiling has  been a round for a  
37:05 
rea lly long time 
37:07 
firs t profile  was  done  in 
37:09 
for jack the  ripper i don't know 18 
37:11 
s omething or other 
37:12 
uh and it's  deve loped 
37:16 
a s  a  
37:17 
a  a s pect of crim inology for yea rs  i mean 
37:20 
s ince  then um 
37:22 
and there  a re  
37:24 
um you know techniques  
37:26 
uh tha t a re  
37:28 
well recognized well known and us ed in 
37:31 
in in in 
37:33 
crimina l jus tice  
37:34 
uh ta lking about them from a  uh 
37:38 




becaus e  the  key bas ica lly is  the 
37:45 




it's  a ll ba s ed on collecting uh wha t 
37:50 
amounts  to  evidence  of uh you know kind 
37:53 
of the  na ture  of the  crime uh a ll crimes  
37:56 
have  motiva ted opportunity and s o you 
37:58 
can kind of c la s s ify wha t you s ee  and 
38:01 
wha t you read 
38:02 
in thos e  actions  as  um you know a  means  
38:06 
of kind of uh cha racte rizing the 
38:08 
individua l tha t tha t's  bas ica lly 
38:09 






s ince  it's  done  on a  digita l device  tha t 
38:15 
actua lly makes  it s ort of ea s ie r uh 
38:19 
becaus e  uh it's  pos s ible  to  build a  
38:22 
inductive  profile  uh us ing evidence  tha t 
38:25 
you ga ther 
38:27 
from the  actua l actions  tha t a re  taken 
38:29 
on the  um you know by the  individua l uh 
38:33 




you know kind of acces s ed through s ys tem 
38:39 
logs  and things  like  tha t um then 
38:41 
es s entia lly wha t you've  got is  a  pa tte rn 
38:44 
of behavior tha t may or may not be  us ed 
38:46 
to kind of crea te  a  typology and tha t 
38:48 
typology is  s omething tha t you can then 
38:50 
us e  a s  a  bas is  for 
38:52 
e ither inves tiga ting or 
38:55 
preventing a  type  of 
38:58 
a  uh you know 
39:01 




things  like s ys tem logs  and s ys tem leve l 
39:08 




a re  a re  firs t of a ll 
39:16 
they exis t uh you know in the  s ens e tha t 
39:18 
tha t it 's  s omething tha t's  pa rt of 
39:20 
s ys tem proces s ing um and a t the  s ame 
39:23 
time uh you know there  a re  timelines  and 
39:26 
things  like tha t tha t you can us e 
39:28 




kind of not kind of for for following 
39:34 
the  text 
39:37 
and cha racte rizing 
39:40 
the  times tamp time pa tte rn ana lys is  
39:43 
aga in is  a  fa irly common um 
39:46 






we were  us ing uh 
39:54 




the  kind of coding 
39:59 
a ttacks  
40:00 
uh things  like s tylis tic  and linguis tic 
40:03 
cha racte ris tics  a ll tha t's  s omething 
40:06 
tha t the  machine keeps  jus t s imply a s  
40:08 
pa rt of its  proces s ing 
40:10 
but a t the  s ame time you have  a  
40:14 
opportunity to us e  tha t a s  evidence  or 
40:17 




of of crim ina l activity or if you want 
40:25 




on uh and and thos e a ttacks  bas ica lly 
40:30 
can can be  uh formed into 
40:33 
a  um 
40:35 








now the  idea  here  bas ica lly is  tha t and 
40:44 
thos e  of you who a re  s itting lis tening 
40:46 
to this  a re  s aying well tha t tha t s ounds  
40:48 
like  ne twork uh intrus ion de tection 
40:51 
automa ted intrus ion detection s ys tems  
40:54 
which is  true 
40:55 




um you know the  rea lm  of actua l um you 
41:03 
know any kind of progres s ive  action 
41:05 
taken aga ins t a  
41:07 
ta rge t 
41:10 
a  ta rge ted res ource 
41:12 






tha t you can es s entia lly build a  defens e 
41:21 
aga ins t or res pond to as  appropria te  
41:25 
um now s ince  this  is  an a i 
41:28 
uh s es s ion uh the thing tha t i wanted to 
41:31 
ra is e  is  the  fact tha t this  can be 
41:32 
managed by a rtific ia l inte lligence  
41:35 
now wha t you end up with is  
41:37 
uh you know three  genera l types  of of of 
41:41 




management s ys tems  uh one  is  s imply to 
41:48 
have  a  bas e line  of profiles  
41:50 
uh which then ended up a s  a  pre tty much 
41:54 




its  crim ina l behavior 
42:00 
a t the  point of a  tag 
42:02 
um and then do s omething appropria te  in 
42:04 
te rms  of e ither s hutting off the  s ys tem 
42:06 
or s hutting out the  acces s  or even jus t 
42:09 
s ending a  s igna l tha t s ays  we 're  be ing 
42:11 
a ttacked um 
42:13 
you can a ls o us e  bas e line  anomalies  
42:15 
which is  bas ica lly the s ame thing you 
42:17 
got a  profile  but in this  pa rticula r 
42:19 
cas e  you ge t s omething tha t jus t s imply 
42:21 
does n't fit ins ide the  profile  and with 
42:24 
the  a s s umption tha t uh if it 's  anomalous  
42:27 
it's  probably enemy action 
42:29 
and tha t can actua lly 
42:31 
identify things  tha t a re  not neces s a rily 
42:34 
a  uh 
42:35 
wha t do you ca ll it captured in the 
42:38 
behavior pa tte rns  
42:39 
tha t you've  us ed to build the  profile  
42:43 
the  problem with tha t one  is  can 
42:44 
genera te  
42:45 
fa ls e  pos itives  a  lot of fa ls e  pos itives  
42:48 
and s o it's  not s omething tha t's  rea lly 
42:49 
very practica l right now and la s t but 
42:51 
not leas t you can have  anomalous  
42:53 
proces s ing 
42:54 
which is  uh 
42:56 
we 'll identify the  a ttack a s  it's  
42:58 
happening becaus e es s entia lly wha t's  
43:00 
going on in te rms  of the norma l s equence 
43:02 
of events  ins ide  the computer is  not 
43:06 
it's  not kos her it's  not s omething tha t 
43:09 
would be  norma l if tha t's  the ca s e um 
43:12 
you know you can ge t a  warning a t the 
43:14 
point where  the  a ttack's  occurring 
43:17 
the  problem with tha t aga in is  this  
43:18 
complex is  kind of ha rd to manage and 
43:21 
a ll this  bas ica lly is  nothing more  than 
43:23 
me ta lking about 
43:24 
um kind of s ome novel approach tha t you 
43:27 
might take  bas ed on wha t amounts  to 
43:30 
well-es tablis hed 
43:33 
uh proces s es  
43:35 
uh both uh from a  crim ina l jus tice 
43:37 




and um tha t from my you know is  
43:44 
bas ica lly a ll i have  to ta lk about here 
43:46 
uh any ques tions  any dis cus s ions  you 
43:48 
want i gues s  i'll handle  tha t a t the end 
43:54 




and our la s t s peaker today is  dick 
43:59 
wilkins  principa l technology lia is on for 
44:01 
phoenix technologies  lim ited a  us -bas ed 
44:04 
independent pla tform firmware 
44:05 
deve lopment company and a ls o an 
44:07 
a s s ocia te  profes s or of computer s cience 
44:09 
and cyber s ecurity a t thomas  college  in 
44:11 
centra l ma ine  recently re tired 
44:14 
he  s its  on the  boa rd of the  unified 
44:16 
extens ible  firmware  inte rface  forum and 
44:19 
leads  our s ecurity res pons e  team he 's  a  
44:22 
leader in the  ieee  a t the  s ection leve l 
44:24 
and in the computer s ocie ty and is  
44:26 
active  in the  acm and pmi he  has  over 30 
44:29 
yea rs  indus try experience  in roles  from 
44:32 
s oftware engineer to  director of 
44:33 
engineering a t companies  like  hugh 
44:35 
packa rd digita l equipment corpora tion 
44:37 




profes s or wilkins  holds  a  phd in 
44:42 
computer s cience  from nova  s outheas te rn 
44:45 
univers ity a  mas te r of s cience  in 
44:47 
computer s cience  from the  na tiona l 
44:49 
technologica l univers ity 
44:51 
and a  bache lor of a rts  in public  
44:53 
adminis tra tion from s a int thomas  
44:54 




thank you very much dr upton i 
45:02 
apprecia te  the 
45:04 
introduction um le t me go ahead and ge t 
45:07 








i'm  going to take  this  
45:21 
from the  genera l to 
45:23 
a  little  more  s pecific  i'm going to ta lk 
45:26 
about a i in re la tion to s ecurity a round 
45:30 
pla tform  firmware 
45:32 
now mos t of you may s ay well gee 
45:35 
is n't tha t pla tform  firmware  s tuff uh 
45:38 
s omething tha t runs  in the  firs t couple  
45:40 
of m illis econds  or you know firs t few 
45:42 
s econds  a t mos t of the  computer s ys tem 
45:45 




why do i ca re  and wha t does  this  
45:50 
inte res t me 
45:51 
uh wha t 
45:53 
why do i ca re  about the  s ecurity of tha t 
45:54 




it's  a  s e rious  problem in uh tha t i'm 
46:02 
going to be  demons tra ting to you but in 
46:04 
our firs t pres enta tion today a  couple  of 
46:07 
thos e  ea rlie r and mos t impactful a ttacks  
46:11 
and pa rticula rly 
46:13 
notorious  is  the  s audi a rabian 
46:17 
a ramco a ttack was  a  firmware  a ttack 
46:20 
where  they exfiltra ted a  bunch of 
46:23 






over 35 000 computers  into boa t anchors  
46:32 
and the company had to comple te ly 
46:34 
replace  the ir entire  it infra s tructure 
46:38 
s o this  is  an example  of how s erious  
46:40 




there  we  go s o firmware  is  critica l 
46:52 
it's  the  runs  right a fte r power up 
46:54 
initia ls  tha t initia lizes  the  cpu and 
46:57 




it controls  the  highly s ecure  inte r 
47:04 
proces s or modes  tha t even the  opera ting 
47:06 
s ys tem and hypervis ors  can't touch 
47:09 
it protects  non-vola tile  memory s ys tem 
47:11 
upda tes  e tc  it s ecure ly boots  the  os  and 
47:15 
ma inta ins  a  route  of trus t from the  cpu 
47:19 
ha rdware  its e lf tha t power up through 
47:21 
a ll of the  initia liza tion and boot 
47:23 
loaders  and everything e ls e  
47:25 
out to  an opera ting s ys tem and 
47:27 
theore tica lly a ll the  way out to  an 
47:29 
applica tion s o tha t the s ys tem can be 
47:32 
proven to be  s ecure  a t a t lea s t until 
47:34 
the  app runs  
47:36 
now once  it's  online  and connecting to 
47:39 
the  inte rne t of cours e  a ll be ts  a re  off 
47:41 
and it can be  a ttacked but 
47:43 
vendors  s oftware  vendors  and opera ting 
47:45 
s ys tem vendors  have  been working rea lly 
47:47 
ha rd over the  la s t 
47:49 
many yea rs  to  well ever s ince  the 
47:53 
inte rne t 
47:54 
s ys tem s ta rted ge tting connected to the 
47:56 
inte rne t to  protect the ir s tuff 
47:59 
and s o it turns  out tha t um wha t's  le ft 
48:02 
is  firmware 
48:04 
um continuing with my lis t here  it can 
48:07 
a ttes t to the  s ys tem s ecurity the 
48:09 
firmware  can and provide  evidence  to an 
48:11 
externa l verifie r 
48:13 
tha t the  s ys tem is  okay 
48:15 
um and it provides  critica l s e rvices  to 
48:18 
os  os 's  and applica tions  while  they're  
48:20 
running and people  don't rea lize  tha t's  
48:23 
going on but the  firmware  is  s till there  
48:25 
and s till opera tiona l and la s tly it's  
48:29 
pers is tent 
48:31 
if you can modify change  or hack a  
48:34 
s ys tem firmware  then 
48:37 
it's  there  potentia lly forever 
48:40 
and even wiping the  s ys tem and s ta rting 
48:42 
with a  new dis k drive  or s omething like 
48:44 
tha t can't remove  it 
48:46 
s o as  
48:47 
pa raphras ing a  google  engineer from a  
48:50 
few a  few yea rs  ago if you don't own 
48:52 




wha t is  pla tform  firmware  it's  you know 
49:00 
it's  the  thing tha t i've  been ta lking 
49:01 
about here  but 
49:03 
depending on the  implementa tion and wha t 
49:05 
it's  for and wha t kind of pla tform  it is  
49:08 
it can be  thous ands  of lines  to  millions  
49:10 
of lines  of code 
49:13 




uefi s tanda rd 
49:18 
and a s  the  footnote  here  on the  s lides  
49:21 
is  the  unified extens ible  firmware  
49:23 
inte rface  s pecifica tion tha t defines  the 
49:27 
inte rfaces  be tween 
49:29 




the  underlying firmware 
49:35 
during the  boot proces s  and then a fte r 
49:36 
the  s ys tem is  up and running 
49:39 
there  is  a  cus tom 
49:42 
mos t implementa tions  of this  a re  
49:44 
cus tomized from an 
49:46 
open s ource  tiana  core  implementa tion 
49:49 
tha t's  code  name from when it was  firs t 
49:52 
s ubmitted to the  open s ource 
49:54 
there  a re  a ls o older 
49:57 
boot firmware  ca lled u-boot and core 
50:00 
boot a re  the  mos t common they're  a ls o 
50:02 
open s ource  they're  typica lly us ed for 
50:05 
embedded and iot devices  and a  lot for 
50:09 
phones  and things  like  tha t they form 
50:11 
the  bas is  for s ome of the  chrome books  
50:13 
and things  like  tha t out there  but um 
50:16 
nowadays  they're  now s tanda rdizing on 
50:20 
the  uefi inte rfaces  s o even while  it's  a  
50:22 
comple te ly diffe rent implementa tion 
50:24 
they're  doing uefi things  
50:27 
la s tly there 's  linux boot 
50:30 
bas ica lly a  
50:31 
minima l linux 
50:34 




this  is  more of an experimenta l thing 
50:40 
tha t's  going on and a  lot of people  a re  
50:42 




commercia l s ys tems  
50:49 
modern implementa tions  of this  of a ll of 
50:52 
thes e  us e  has hing and s igna tures  to  make 
50:55 




they a ls o us e  s ecure  upda tes  in any 
51:00 
rollback to make  s ure  tha t nobody is  
51:04 
providing them bad code  over the 
51:06 
inte rne t and caus ing them to upda te  or 
51:09 
roll back to older uns ecure  code  e tc 
51:13 
they a ls o tend to meas ure  thems elves  
51:15 
a ls o re fe rred to a s  meas ured boot 
51:18 
s o tha t they can a ttes t 
51:21 
to the ir s ecurity and the fact they've 
51:23 
been unmodified to an externa l verifie r 
51:28 
tha t may control the ir acces s  to 
51:29 
ne tworks  and things  like  tha t 
51:33 
a s  
51:34 
thes e  things  tha t i've  been ta lking 
51:36 
about here  a re  bes t practices  
51:38 
they're  the  things  tha t s hould be  done 
51:40 




many low-cos t and iot devices  embedded 
51:48 
s ys tems  and s urpris ingly and annoyingly 
51:52 
a  lot of pcs  and s ervers  out there 
51:56 
don't follow this  or they turn it off or 
52:00 
and s o they're  not a s  s ecure  a s  they 
52:02 




this  is  not your 1970s  bios  the  thing we 
52:09 
ta lked about you us ua lly s ee 
52:12 
the  indus try continues  to us e  the  te rm 
52:14 




rea lly is n't anything like wha t ibm 
52:21 
crea ted for the ir firs t pc back in the 
52:24 




i put up this  not 
52:31 
for any s pecific  piece  of informa tion 
52:33 
but i want to  point out jus t genera lly 
52:35 
the  million line  plus  
52:38 




cha rt of 
52:46 




um but there 's  a ll kinds  of other code 
52:52 
tha t runs  during the boot proces s  
52:55 
tha t s ecures  the  s ys tem upda tes  the 
52:58 
microcode  this  is  for a  currently uh 
53:01 
wide ly ava ilable  
53:03 
inte l proces s or an example  of the  bill 
53:06 
of ma teria ls  of the  firmware  tha t 
53:08 
ge ts  loaded a t boot time and initia lized 
53:11 
and run during the  s ta rtup of an inte l 
53:14 
uh cpu s o the  de ta ils  don't ma tte r here 
53:17 
i'm  jus t pointing out there 's  a  lot of 
53:18 
s tuff here  and it's  rea lly important and 
53:22 
if it ge ts  
53:23 
damaged in s ome way by a  hacker bad 
53:26 










this  is  an a i pres enta tion s o i want to 
53:40 
make s ure  tha t we  tie  this  back to how 
53:43 
does  a i fit into this  is s ue  of s ecurity 
53:47 
of pla tform  firmware s o if i'm  an i.t 
53:50 
manager i want to  know a ll the  devices  
53:51 
in my s ys tem a re  following the  bes t 
53:54 
practices  and a re  properly protected 
53:56 
they're  doing the right thing with the ir 
53:57 
firmware  becaus e aga in if any of them 
54:01 
is  compromis ed they can a ll be 
54:03 
compromis ed and 
54:05 




i've  s een bas eboa rd management 
54:11 
controlle rs  in multi-m illion dolla r 
54:14 
s ervers  with hundreds  or hundreds  of 
54:17 
proces s ors  anyway uh where  the  bas eboa rd 
54:20 
management controlle r an old piece  of 
54:23 
firmware  and s oftware  tha t 
54:26 
manages  the  s ys tem opera tion where  tha t 
54:28 
thing has  been pene tra ted 
54:30 
and it has  s pread 
54:33 
an infection to every virtua l machine 
54:36 
running acros s  hundreds  of proces s ors  
54:39 
within the  s ame box 
54:40 
and then it can then expand out to the 
54:42 




i want to  be  able  to  s can a ll the 
54:47 
devices  in my ne twork in rea l time and 
54:50 
identify vulnerable  damaged devices  
54:53 
anything bad tha t could be  going on and 
54:56 
i want to 
54:57 
identify devices  a t ris k even if they're  
54:59 
not currently behaving badly intrus ion 
55:03 
de traction s ys tems  a re  fine  monitoring 
55:05 
the  ne twork us ing a i to look for 
55:08 
pa tte rns  and bad behaviors  and identify 
55:10 
devices  tha t have been damaged but 
55:13 
gee  wouldn't it be  nice  to be  able  to 
55:16 
identify them before  they go rogue 
55:19 
before  they s ta rt 
55:20 
exfiltra ting da ta  from my from my 
55:23 




but there  a re  thous ands  of devices  
55:30 
they're  running firmware  from many 
55:31 
s ources  and of many types  
55:33 
i've  ta lked in the  previous  s lide  about 
55:36 
gee  how much there  is  out there 
55:38 
um how can i make  s ure  tha t they're  not 
55:41 
vulnerable  they're  not damaged by an 
55:44 
a ttacker tha t they're  not 
55:47 
in s ome way going to come and bite  me in 
55:49 




one  option is  us e  a i machine  lea rnings  
55:55 
to s can them and eva lua te  the ir the ir 
55:58 
a s s e ts  
55:59 
s o here 's  a  
56:01 
kind of a  marke ting picture  rea lly of 
56:03 






a  us er inte rface 
56:12 
it's  s tep one  there  tha t you can 
56:15 
s chedule  an immedia te  s can of your of 
56:17 
your ne twork or 
56:19 
have  a  
56:20 




then we have  s canning s oftware the  red 
56:26 
ba ll in the  middle 
56:28 
tha t goes  out and touches  everything on 
56:30 




takes  a  look a t the  firmware  
56:36 
tha t's  running there  its  a ttributes  its  
56:38 
configura tion e tc 
56:41 
and then um 
56:43 




which runs  a i a lgorithms  to uh 
56:50 






becaus e  we 're  running out of time 
56:58 
we want to  extract 
57:01 
an image of wha t's  going on we want to 
57:02 
s cout it for improper configura tion 
57:06 
va lid code  s igna tures  e tc  known 
57:08 
vulnerabilities  this  can be  done without 
57:10 
machine  lea rning but then we can us e 
57:14 
machine  lea rning s imula te  the  code flow 
57:17 
to make  s ure a  cha in of trus t is  
57:19 
ma inta ined regenera te  c  code  from the 
57:21 
bina ry image  do s ta tic  code  ana lys is  e tc 
57:25 
we can identify inventabilities  obs erve 
57:27 




identify is s ues  and we can take 
57:32 
automa tic  action or we  can te ll an i.t 
57:35 
manager tha t this  device  is  s us pect and 
57:37 
you want to  eva lua te  it and do manua l 
57:40 




la s tly before  i wrap up here  i jus t want 
57:46 
to s ay we can apply this  to  other 
57:48 
potentia l kinds  of ne tworks  how about 5g 
57:50 
ne tworks  with phones  and table ts  and iot 
57:53 
how about s mart vehicle  s ys tems  autos  
57:55 
trucks  e tc  and wha t about tha t 
57:58 
autonomous  vehicle  wouldn't you like  to 
58:00 
have  s omebody checking tha t the 
58:01 
driverles s  de livery truck firmware  
58:04 
tha t's  trave ling in the  lane  next to you 
58:05 
on the  highway is  actua lly s ecure and 
58:08 
s a fe  
58:09 
and there  a re  potentia lly many other uh 
58:12 




tha t's  it for me thank you 
58:23 
s o unfortuna te ly we 're  out of time um 
58:26 
exce llent pres enta tions  thank you very 
58:28 
much it's  been a  plea s ure  to modera te  
58:29 
this  pane l and the  pane lis ts  been typing 
58:32 
the ir ans wers  for s ome of the  ques tions  
58:33 




and for c los ing remarks  here 's  dr eberty 
58:40 
thanks  very much uh aga in 
58:43 
julia  our modera tor and a ls o our 
58:45 
s peakers  and a ls o thos e  of you who 
58:47 
a ttended this  live  pres enta tion or 
58:49 
wa tching the  recording la te r if you put 
58:51 
your ques tion q a  and the  s peakers  were 
58:53 
not able  to  ans wer them live  will pos t 
58:57 
the ir ans wers  la te r on on our a i webs ite  
59:00 
i jus t want to  bring to your a ttention 
59:02 
tha t if you like  this  pres enta tion we 
59:03 
have  our october 7th event coming up a i 
59:06 
in s pace and aeros pace event and a ls o uh 
59:09 
we have  our november four events  a r in 
59:12 
hea lth ca re  and we have  nas a  and nih 
59:15 
s peakers  coming in s o thanks  very much 
59:17 
aga in everyone for joining us  today and 
59:19 
uh you can wa tch the recording of this  
59:21 
la te r 
59:22 
uh on our webs ite  if you would like  a  
59:25 
pdh or cu certifica te  you can jus t ema il 
59:28 
your name and ema il addres s  and your 
59:30 
a ffilia tion to the  ema il i s ha red in the 
59:32 
cha t box um.a i a t ma in.tdu i rece ived 
59:36 
your certifica te  s o thanks  aga in and s ee 
59:38 




The University of Maine in Orono is the flagship campus of the University of Maine System, where 
efforts toward racial equity are ongoing, as is the commitment to facing a complicated and not 
always just institutional history. The University recognizes that it is located on Marsh Island in the 
homeland of the Penobscot nation, where issues of water and its territorial rights, and 
encroachment upon sacred sites, are ongoing. Penobscot homeland is connected to the other 
Wabanaki Tribal Nations — the Passamaquoddy, Maliseet, and Micmac — through kinship, 
alliances, and diplomacy. The university also recognizes that the Penobscot Nation and the other 
Wabanaki Tribal Nations are distinct, sovereign, legal and political entities with their own powers 
of self-governance and self-determination. 
